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Non-technical summary
Germany's 2005 welfare reform introduced two competing organizational systems for the administration and activation of welfare recipients. In the majority of the 439 German districts, a centralized organization was established where local employment offices and local authorities had to form a joint venture which is subject to the central directives and guidelines of the Federal Employment Agency (FEA). Within the joint venture, the FEA is in charge of the administration of benefits, job placement and the application of the main instruments of active labor market policy. The local authorities have the task to administer payments for housing costs and special needs. Moreover, they provide counseling in case of specific contexts such as lone parent status, home care for elderly or disabled relatives, or addiction to alcohol and drugs.
In a policy experiment, 69 out of the 439 districts were allowed to opt out for a decentralized organization of welfare administration. In the decentralized agencies the local authorities autonomously organize welfare administration. They are responsible for the entire activation process, including counseling, the disbursement of benefits, job placement and the allocation of benefit recipients to active labor market policy programs. Thus, the FEA is not involved and decentralized welfare agencies can decide on their own on how to activate the welfare recipients. The decentralized welfare agencies are legally and organizationally independent from central directives and guidelines. All other components of public welfare and labor market policy -such as benefit entitlements, the taxbenefit system in general, and labor market institutions such as minimum wages and employment protection -apply equally to the centralized and the decentralized system of welfare administration.
In this paper we evaluate the relative success of both systems. Our empirical analysis is based on a unique data set compiled from in-depths surveys of welfare administration, register data of the FEA, comprehensive surveys of welfare recipients and extensive regional information. The data contain information on organizational and strategic features of welfare agencies which is usually unavailable.
They contain information about a sample of individuals who received welfare benefits in October 2006 and who are followed until December 2007.
We find that decentralized welfare administration has a negative effect on the chances of male welfare recipients to take up employment providing a sufficient living income and leading to exit from welfare receipt. Given the low transition intensity from welfare receipt into employment in general, the magnitudes of the effects are substantial. Compared with centralized welfare agencies, the integration rate of decentralized welfare agencies is up to 25 percent lower during the observation period. For women, we also find negative effects, which are, however, statistically insignificant. No significant differences are found when considering employment with supplementary welfare receipt as the outcome. Based on these results, we conclude that centralized standards and routines work effectively for individuals without further obstacles to employment. Once additional problems, such as a lack of child care facilities, come into play, standardized placement loses its effectiveness. In particular, tailormade solutions to individual needs often require the cooperation of local actors. This is why, in our opinion, the centralized model has no significant advantage over the decentralized model in case of female welfare recipients.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine dezentralisierte Organisation bei hilfebedürftigen Männern einen substantiell negativen Effekt auf deren Chancen hat, eine bedarfsdeckende Beschäftigung aufzunehmen, also 
Introduction
The organization of public welfare institutions differs greatly between countries. Studies from economics, management and organization theories suggest that the form of organization, particularly the centralization or decentralization of responsibilities, may have far-reaching implications (Besley and Coate, 2003; Richardson et al., 2002; Hutchcroft, 2001) . Also, in the case of welfare administration, different organizational systems are likely to result in different incentives and strategies and can influence the success of bringing unemployed welfare recipients back into employment. Given that public welfare spending accounts for a significant portion of total government expenditure, and given that labor market integration of welfare recipients is the principal task of the public welfare administration for the unemployed, the improvement of organizational effectiveness is a question of foremost economic importance.
One key component in the organization of welfare administration is the degree of local autonomy versus centralization. In a decentralized setting, local authorities are responsible for the activation of welfare recipients and act independently from central directives and guidelines. Conversely, in a centralized structure, welfare administration is organized by a countrywide government agency that issues directives on how the activation of welfare recipients should be implemented at the local level.
The degree of centralization of welfare administration varies considerably between countries. In the Netherlands, local authorities form the basis of the public welfare system. In the UK, by contrast, public welfare administration is part of the central government structure.
In other countries, welfare reform has changed the degree of centralization of welfare administration. The 1996 U.S. welfare reform, for instance, devolved greater program authority from the federal level to the states, and the Canadian reform that same year gave greater discretion to the provinces (Blank, 2002) .
Theoretical arguments in favor of a decentralized organization are based on the idea that local authorities are better informed about the characteristics of the local labor market.
They are assumed to have detailed knowledge about the specific attributes and changes that have been made, and are thought to be most effective in providing services that are tailored to local conditions. Conversely, central organizations often have an advantage in bundling resources, collecting information from various sources, and imposing best-practice strategies for its local offices.
Even though there is an increasing evaluation literature concerning the effectiveness of active labor market policy programs and certain elements of welfare reform (most of them from the United States 1 , Germany 2 or other European 3 countries), evidence of the effects of the welfare system organization is scarce. One reason for this is that centralization or decentralization applies to countries as a whole, which makes it difficult to detangle the effects of a particular organizational setting from other aspects of the welfare system or its reform. So far, conclusions are derived from case studies only (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008; Tergeist and Grubb, 2006) .
The aim of this paper is to provide quantitative evidence on the relative performance of a centralized and decentralized organization of welfare administration. We exploit the 2005 reform of the German welfare system that introduced two competing types of organization -a centralized and a decentralized structure -in an otherwise homogenous institutional framework. According to the experimentation clause in the German Social Code, both approaches were pursued in parallel for a limited period of time, after which, the more successful model should be determined. 4 In most districts, a centralized organization was established, in which the welfare agencies are subject to the directives and guidelines of the Federal Employment
Agency. However, a total of 69 out of the 439 German districts were allowed to opt out in favor of a decentralized organization that is legally and organizationally independent from central directives and guidelines. Virtually all other components of public welfare and labor market policy -such as benefit entitlements, the tax-benefit system in general, and labor market institutions such as minimum wages and employment protection -apply equally to the centralized and decentralized systems of welfare administration.
In order to evaluate the performance of the two organizational systems, we investigate the successful integration of welfare recipients into the labor market. Our empirical analysis is 1 For a review of U.S. welfare reforms and the related empirical literature, we refer to Blank (2002 ), Moffitt (2002 , and Grogger and Karoly (2005) . Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001) synthesize the results of 29 studies investigating the effects of various US welfare-to-work programs. 3 Surveys on welfare reform in Europe (countries other than Germany) are provided by Torfing (1999); Kildal (2001); and Halvorsen and Jensen (2004) for the Nordic countries; Finn (2000) ; Beaudry (2002); and Dostal (2008) for the UK, and Finn (2000) and Knijn (2001) for the Netherlands. See also Martin and Grubb (2001) and Kluve (2006) for comprehensive overviews. based on a unique data set that is compiled from in-depth surveys of welfare administration, FEA register data, comprehensive surveys of welfare recipients and extensive regional information. These data contain information on the organizational and strategic features of welfare agencies, which is usually unavailable.
In the next section, we describe the set-up of the German welfare system for the preand post-reform period. Section 3 introduces the data, while Section 4 outlines the methodological approach. Estimation results are presented in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in the final section.
The German Welfare Reform of 2005
Before 2005, the same organization of welfare administration applied to all 439 districts (in German, Kreise and kreisfreie Städte) in Germany. There were two different types of benefits: unemployment and social assistance, which were administered by two different authorities.
The centrally organized Federal Employment Agency (FEA), represented by the local employment offices, was in charge of unemployment assistance, a means-tested benefit for individuals with long-term unemployment after their claims to unemployment insurance benefits had expired. Local authorities, in contrast, were responsible for social assistance, a benefit for individuals who had not accumulated sufficient benefit entitlements to be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits or who were unable to work. This organization of the welfare system, with its two distinct administrative bodies, was often judged as overly fragmented (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; Konle-Seidl et al., 2007) and resulted in disincentives with respect to integration into the labor market.
To remove these shortcomings, welfare system reform, implemented in January 2005, merged unemployment and social assistance into a single benefit, Unemployment Benefit II (UBII). In contrast to unemployment assistance, and similar to the former social assistance, UBII does not depend on former earnings. To be eligible for UBII, persons must be between the ages of 15 to 64 and must be able to work for at least 15 hours per week. Means-testing takes into account the wealth and income of all individuals living in the household. Individuals who are employed but have insufficient household income are also eligible for the benefit.
UBII recipients are obliged to actively look for work and to participate in the welfare-to-work programs that are assigned to them. Out of the 439 German districts, 69 were allowed to opt for a more decentralized organization of welfare administration. 7 Under this system, local authorities autonomously operate the entire activation process, including counseling, benefits disbursement, job placement, and the allocation of benefit recipients to active labor market programs. In particular, local welfare agencies are legally and organizationally independent from central directives and guidelines in the decentralized system. Table 1 summarizes the key characteristics of centralized and decentralized welfare agencies. In both the centralized and the decentralized systems, the largest share of welfare payment is financed by the federal government; only a small fraction of overall expenditureidentical in all districts -is taken from local tax budgets.
Include Table 1 here.
5 This joint venture is called Arbeitsgemeinschaft (ARGE) in German. 6 A variant of this model arose where the local employment office and local authorities could not agree on forming a joint venture. In this case, both institutions continued to work separately in the district. However, because tasks are shared in a similar way as in the case of the centralized system, we do not differentiate between these two types in the empirical analysis. 7 The German term for a decentralized district is zugelassener kommunaler Träger (zkT).
It is important to understand the selection of districts into the two regimes. The number of decentralized districts (69) is equal to the number of deputies in the Bundesrat, the second chamber of the German Parliament. Each federal state could have anywhere between three and six decentralized districts, corresponding to its number of deputies in the Bundesrat.
Within each state, districts could apply to opt out of the centralized system. In cases of excess demand, the state government made a selection from the applying districts.
In several federal states, the maximum number of districts that could opt for decentralized organization was not exhausted. The vacant places could then be filled by the districts not selected from other states in the first round. Looking at the regional distribution of appli-
cations, it appears that the selection process was strongly influenced by political affiliations.
In both Lower Saxony and Hesse, where the conservative governments were strongly in favor of the decentralized system, 13 districts were allowed to opt out, even though these states only had 6 and 5 seats in the Bundesrat, respectively. In contrast, hardly any districts were proposed from Mecklenburg-West Pomerania or Rhineland-Palatinate, both of which were run at that time by social democrats. Hence, the rules for selection resulted in a regional concentration of decentralized agencies (WZB et al., 2008) .
Description of the Data
In order to investigate whether centralized or decentralized welfare agencies are more successful in integrating welfare recipients into employment, we use a unique data set that was specifically collected for this research question. 8 The data are confined to 154 districts, a subset of all 439 German districts; of the sample districts, 51 are decentralized. The remaining 103 districts have a centralized organization. They were selected to obtain regional units with similar characteristics as the 51 decentralized agencies. Although evidence suggests that the adoption of a decentralized system was driven by the political affiliation of the state governments (WZB et al., 2008) , some association could remain between local labor market characteristics and the opt-out from centralized welfare administration. Therefore, the distribution of regional characteristics is accounted for in the sampling procedure. In addition, we control for regional characteristics in the matching estimator (see Section 4).
When choosing comparable districts, we built directly on the previous work of Arntz et al. (2006) 9 . These authors identify regional variables that are relevant to the transition of the long-term unemployed into the labor market. In a second step, the authors use the reduced set of relevant regional variables and apply the distance matching suggested by Zhao (2004) to identify comparable districts in a regional matching procedure. Appendix 1 illustrates the regional location of the districts in our sample.
Appendix 2 shows that the matching of regions equalizes the means of the relevant regional variables. The table shows that equality of means cannot be rejected for the majority of the variables; the only exceptions are those variables that depend on the degree of urbanization of the district such as, for example, the share of commuters. Here, the mean in centralized districts is slightly higher than it is in decentralized districts. Furthermore, the employment rate, as an indicator of local labor market conditions, is weakly significantly different between both groups.
To obtain data on the organizational structure of the welfare agencies, repeated interviews (both standardized and semi-structured) were conducted with the agencies' management and staff in the 154 sample units. These surveys provided information about the type of case management, the activation concept, the placement strategies, the mix of active labor market policies, and several other organizational issues. 10 Apart from this information, a wide range of regional variables (e.g., unemployment rates, welfare ratios, GDP, population density, share of foreigners, etc.) were collected for each agency for both before and after the 2005 reform.
The individual-level data consist of a survey of welfare recipients who were registered at the 154 agencies. Between January and April 2007, 100 to 300 telephone interviews were conducted within each agency with welfare recipients; the number of interviews depended on the size of the welfare agency. In total, nearly 24,600 interviews were conducted. Approximately 80% (20,300) of the individuals interviewed were drawn from the stock of UBII recipients who were receiving welfare benefits in October 2006 (stock sample), whereas 20%
(4,300) of the interviews are from an inflow sample of people entering the welfare system between August and December 2006. Unfortunately, entries into UBII in earlier months could not be sampled due to gaps in the data (see Section 4). In this paper, our analysis focuses on 9 The study by Arntz et al. (2006) was conducted to prepare the evaluation of the welfare reform. 10 We use some of these organizational strategies in Section 5.2 to provide additional insights into the black box of welfare administration.
the stock sample. Because a large share of UBII recipients depend on welfare benefits for an extended period of time, the stock sample covers those individuals for whom the organization of welfare administration matters the most.
The survey data include individual characteristics (gender, age, marital and parental status, education, health and disability status, migration background, etc.), information on members of the household (number and age of household members and respondent's relation to them), and details concerning the labor market status and labor market history (current labor market state, former spells of insured and minor employment, former spells of unemployment, receipt of welfare benefits, participation in activation programs). Moreover, the surveys contain information about basic skills (e.g. reading, writing, math, and computer skills), further qualifications (e.g. driver's license), job search activities, and the concessions that respondents would be willing to make in order to obtain a new job.
The survey data were linked with administrative data from the FEA at the individual level. The administrative data include daily information about periods of employment and unemployment, job seeking, participation in active labor market programs, and benefit re- 
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Because our analysis focuses on integration into employment, we restrict the sample to individuals who were unemployed at the time they entered the welfare system and at the time 11 The administrative data only contains information regarding employment that is subject to social insurance contribution. Therefore, our two outcome variables do not include spells of minor employment or selfemployment. Both outcome variables are measured as binary variables.
of sampling. Furthermore, we restrict the data to persons aged between 18 and 57 years; 12 due to these restrictions, we have 13,286 observations (4,489 persons from districts with decentralized welfare organization and 8,797 from districts with centralized organization).
Estimation Approach

Individual Selection into Treatment
In the following, we consider decentralized organization of the local welfare administration as our treatment variable. To identify the causal effect, we must rule out selective participation in treatment. The most common types of selectivity encountered in the evaluation of labor market policies are self-selection and selection by a caseworker into the program. In our case, these types of selectivity were very unlikely. From the point of view of a welfare recipient or the caseworker, the 2005 reform of welfare administration and organization is an exogenous event that cannot be easily influenced. The only way to select into treatment would be to move to another district. However, welfare recipients usually cannot afford to relocate and are not encouraged to move as long as they remain on welfare.
A more serious problem could be that our sample was not drawn in January 2005
(when the reform was introduced) but in 2006, i.e. more than one year after the implementation of the reform. The reason for this delay is that the disruptions caused by the reform created considerable problems for the quality of administrative data during several months after the introduction of the reform. This particularly applied to decentralized welfare agencies, which continued to use their local computer systems. In principle, an interface for data collection was provided by the FEA, allowing these welfare agencies to feed their data directly into the FEA's statistics. In practice, however, the use of the interface was incomplete until the second half of 2006. Centralized agencies, on the other hand, had issues with a newly introduced software system. For these reasons, the quality of the data during the early periods after the reform is insufficient for our analysis. Therefore, we exclusively rely on data from 2006 and 2007. At this point in time, however, the composition of welfare recipients in the districts could itself be an outcome of decentralized or centralized organization. Thus, for example, if the centralized system were faster in integrating welfare recipients with good employment prospects in the early periods after the reform, the stock of welfare recipients in 2006 might 12 Persons aged 58 or older are no longer required to actively search for employment but may remain on welfare benefits until they reach the official retirement age of 65. Individuals aged 15 to 17 years are subject to compulsory schooling and cannot be expected to take up employment.
contain fewer welfare recipients with favorable characteristics than in decentralized districts.
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Another potential kind of selection concerns the inflow into welfare receipt. As mentioned in Section 2, UBII recipients must be able to work for at least 15 hours a week. In determining whether claimants to UBII meet this requirement, welfare agencies possess a considerable degree of leeway. If ability criteria differ systematically between centralized and decentralized welfare agencies, this may result in a different composition of welfare recipients with regard to characteristics such as illness or disability.
In order to solve these potential problems, we use a matching estimator that controls for individual-level selection. Because our data set combines administrative and survey data and captures all conceivable aspects of determining success in the labor market, we are confident that we are able to actually identify the causal effect of treatment. In addition, we check whether regional variables should be included, in addition to restricting the sample to comparable welfare agencies as described in Section 3.
Controlling for Selection by Statistical Matching
We 
The second term on the right-hand side of (1) is not identified from the data without additional assumptions. Simply comparing the observable average outcomes of persons living in districts with centralized welfare agencies to approximate the unobservable outcomes for persons registered at decentralized agencies leads to biased estimates if individuals in the two types of agencies differ in characteristics that affect the expected outcomes, i.e.
To overcome this potential bias, we apply a matching estimator, using persons living in centralized districts who are similar in all relevant characteristics to the treatment group as a control group. The method is based on the intuitive principle that it is possible to "adjust away" differences between treated and non-treated outcomes by finding appropriate matches (Heckman et al., 1999) . If this is true, the matching approach makes it possible to compare the treated and non-treated outcomes directly, without imposing further structure on the estimation problem.
The method of matching is a non-parametric approach and, therefore, no structural or parametric assumptions are required. However, it puts strong requirements on the data. In order for the ATT to be identified, the so-called Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) must be fulfilled (Lechner, 2001 ). This means that, conditional on the set of relevant observable covariates X, the potential outcome Y 0 is independent of the organizational model:
In addition, it must be ensured that people who resemble the welfare recipients' characteristics distribution in districts with decentralized organization are available in districts with centralized welfare administration (common support condition), i.e., Pr(D = 1|X) < 1 (Smith and Todd, 2005a) .
Direct matching on X is difficult if X is of high dimension, as many empty cells for particular combinations of covariate values occur. Therefore, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of balancing scores. One possible balancing score is the probability of being subject to treatment, the propensity score p(X) = E(D = 1|X). This statistic summarizes the relevant covariates X in a single index function. All biases due to observable covariates are removed by conditioning solely on the propensity score.
The literature provides a number of different matching estimators (Heckman et al., 1999) . These estimators differ with respect to the weights given to individuals in the control group that are considered to form the counterfactual outcome. We use a kernel matching estimator, which weighs the control observations according to their "distance" (in terms of the propensity score) to the treated individuals by means of an Epanechnikov kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.06. According to Abadie and Imbens (2008) , bootstrapped standard errors are unbiased for kernel matching (due to the smoothness of the objective function). Therefore, we estimate the standard errors using a bootstrap procedure with 250 replications. Persons residing in the same district may be affected by common shocks; this could affect the statistical inference, although it would not affect the consistency of the estimator. We account for this inference problem by estimating clustered standard errors at the agency level (using the non-overlapping block bootstrap), i.e. by re-sampling persons on the agency level, but not on the individual level.
Lastly, we need to invoke the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1986 ) to render the model useful for causal analysis. The SUTVA rules out any crosseffects, meaning that the outcome for any individual must not depend on whether any other individual is in a centralized or decentralized district. In particular, substitution and displacement effects must not be present. This requires the regional labor markets to be sufficiently separated so that the success of one welfare agency with respect to job placement does not come at the cost of another welfare agency. Moreover, there should not be any general equilibrium effects. These requirements are addressed by a study at the aggregate level of all 439 welfare agencies (see IFO and IAW, 2008) . From the findings of this study, there is robust evidence that the SUTVA holds.
Specification of the Propensity Score and Balancing Tests
As noted above, identification of the estimated treatment effects depends on the plausibility of Our data lacks direct measures of individual motivation, attitudes, and aptitude. It is, however, likely that these characteristics are relatively persistent over time such that they have impacted labor market success before the treatment. For this reason, it is crucial that we are able to condition on individual employment histories in a detailed manner. This is also emphasized by Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman et al. (1998) . Thus, making use of our unusually rich data set, we are confident that we capture all relevant factors that affect both participation in treatment and our outcome variables of interest.
Since we have a large number of potential control variables at our disposal for the specification of the propensity score, and because including irrelevant covariates may introduce noise into the calculation of the propensity score, we choose different specifications in order to check the robustness of the estimated treatment effects. The first specification contains the most important individual characteristics -gender, age, education, household composition, and several indicators for labor market history -as well as limited regional information. Based on the results of balancing tests, this parsimonious specification is our preferred specification. To these variables, we add further regional information in the second specification. The third specification contains the full set of covariates. Descriptive statistics for all variables are contained in Appendix 3, and the estimation results for the propensity score are illustrated in Appendix 4 for our preferred specification. All estimations are done separately for men and women.
Include Table 2 here.
To assess the quality of matching, we apply the following four balancing tests. First, we compare the means of the variables included in the propensity score between treatment and the control group and test for differences by applying t-tests. After successful matching, there should be no remaining differences in the distribution of the covariates. Second, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , who suggest the use of the so-called standardized bias.
Differences in means of single covariates between the treatment and control group are compared before and after matching, standardized by the mean standard deviation across groups before matching. A third test relates to the explanatory power of the propensity score model after matching. Re-running the same probit regression on the matched sample should result in an explained treatment variation of almost zero, as measured by the McFadden-R 2 (Sianesi, 2004 Each variable included in the propensity score is regressed on a higher-order polynomial of the propensity score, the treatment indicator, and the interaction between both. In the ideal case, coefficients β 5 to β 9 should be jointly zero, indicating that there is no further observable selection into the treatment conditional on the propensity score.
As can be seen from the results of the balancing tests depicted in Table 2 and Appendix 3, matching quality is very satisfactory. 14 Appendix 3 shows that the equality of means of the variables included in the propensity score specification between treatment and control group cannot be rejected in just about any case. According to Table 2 , the mean standardized bias is severely reduced after matching. The McFadden-R 2 estimates of the third test are almost zero after matching; thus, as intended, re-running the propensity score specification on the matched sample does not result in any explanatory power of the included covariates. In addition, almost all of the variables included in the propensity score model pass the test suggested by Smith and Todd (2005b) .
Empirical results
For the evaluation of the relative effectiveness of decentralized vs. centralized welfare administration, we distinguish two different outcomes: employment without welfare receipt and employment with welfare receipt. Employment without welfare receipt means that the individual takes up employment and generates enough living income so that the individual does not receive welfare benefits. Employment with welfare receipt means that the individual is employed but still receives welfare benefits because employment does not provide a sufficient living income. Employment with welfare receipt could provide a stepping stone into employment without welfare receipt. From a policy point of view, we consider employment without welfare receipt as the more relevant measure to be used to assess the relative effectiveness of the two administrative models.
14 The table contains results for our preferred specification. A complete set of results is provided by the authors on request.
Before presenting the estimation results, we briefly describe the means of our individual outcome variables and compare them across individuals who are registered at centralized and decentralized welfare agencies (see Figures 1 and 2 ).
Include Figures 1 and 2 here.
For men and employment without welfare receipt, employment rates in districts with centralized welfare agencies are larger than they are in districts with decentralized organization ( Figure 1) . By December 2007, we observe a difference of about one and a half percentage points between decentralized and centralized welfare agencies (16.8% for centralized and 15.2% for decentralized welfare agencies). There is no difference between the two organizational models for women and for employment with welfare receipt for both genders.
Our econometric analysis is consistent with these descriptive findings. As discussed in Section 4, we use three different specifications for the propensity score. The estimated treatment effects of decentralized welfare agencies on the integration into employment without welfare receipt are presented in Figures 3 and 4 for both men and women. Rather than showing treatment effects at a single observation date, we display their evolution over the course of 2007, the year after sampling.
Include Figures 3 and 4 here.
For men, we observe a negative treatment effect, i.e. decentralized welfare agencies are less successful than centralized agencies in placing welfare recipients in jobs that provide a sufficient living income. The absolute effect rises from one to over three percentage points from January to August 2007, and declines moderately thereafter. These magnitudes are slightly larger than the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 1 . The effects for May to November are significant at 5%, with t-statistics ranging from 1.96 to 2.91. With the exception of April, the effects for the other months are significant at 10%. The inclusion of further covariates leaves the estimated effects virtually unaffected. For women, we also find negative treatment effects, which are, however, smaller in magnitude than for men and are not statistically significant.
Given the relatively small fraction of people taking up employment without welfare receipt (Figure 1 ), the effect for men is substantial. The largest estimated effect of 3.5 percentage points, estimated for August 2007, implies that decentralized agencies have a 24%
lower integration quota than do centralized agencies. The differences in the treatment effects between men and women are conspicuous; in principle, the gender differences could result from a different treatment of men and women in each type of welfare agency. As of December, 2007, 44% of centralized agencies, compared to only 14% of decentralized agencies, were lacking a staff member specifically assigned to the task of ensuring equal opportunities and gender mainstreaming (IAW and ZEW, 2008, Table A1 ). This may provide some explanation as to why decentralized agencies perform relatively better in placing women into selfsufficient employment than men. In our interpretation, however, the differences between men and women can also be explained by the fact that it is often more difficult for women than for men to leave benefit receipt ( Figure 1 ). This is primarily due to childcare obligations, which are still borne to a large extent by women, and insufficient child care facilities. Indeed, nearly 30% of female welfare recipients in the sample are single mothers. Also, while 72% of male welfare recipients state that they are capable of fulltime work, this is true for only 52% of the women in the sample (see Appendix 3).
Therefore, the treatment effect for men would suggest that centralized agencies do relatively well in placing welfare recipients into jobs unless further obstacles to employment such as child care obligations are present. In the absence of these obstacles, the centralized structure, with its highly standardized approaches to job placement, proves effective. Once individual obstacles are present, both types of welfare agencies perform equally because standardized procedures do not help in these cases.
Regarding employment with welfare receipt, the estimated treatment effects of decentralized welfare administration tend to be positive (Figures 5 and 6 ). However, the estimated effects are relatively small in magnitude (up to 1.4 percentage points for women, and up to 1 percentage point for men) and are not statistically significant. We tend to find a more pronounced effect for women, with the treatment effect reaching 10% significance in September 2007 in one out of three specifications of the propensity score. However, given the low significance overall, these differences should not be over-emphasized. We also note again that all of our estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables at the regional and individual level.
Include Figures 5 and 6 here.
Looking Deeper into the Black Box of Welfare Administration
The significant treatment effect for men on employment without welfare receipt raises the question of whether centralized agencies are inherently better in placing welfare recipients into jobs or whether they use more successful approaches and strategies than could also be adopted by decentralized agencies. All centralized welfare agencies are subject to central FEA guidelines, central controlling, and certain directives regarding the use of activation strategies.
Nevertheless, welfare agencies have leeway in the way they internally organize their services for welfare recipients. The implementation of organizational approaches is not specific to either administrative model, and we observe variations within both agencies with different or- Table 3 provides a more detailed description of the organizational features, and outlines some arguments as to why they could affect the integration success of welfare recipients. As can also be seen from the table, customer segmentation and particularly, generalized case management tend to be used much more frequently by decentralized agencies; integration of activation and placement is slightly more common among centralized agencies, while the other two strategies are not related to agency type. 15 The effects of further characteristics and strategies of the welfare agencies are considered in ZEW et al.
(2008).
Include Table 3 here.
To check whether the effect of decentralized agencies can be attributed to one of these strategies, we require a multivariate framework using agency type and strategies. For this purpose, we use binary probit models; the probit estimations contain all covariates used in the preferred specification of the propensity score. In addition, dummy variables for decentralized welfare agencies and for the organizational features are included. We then test whether a significant effect of decentralized agencies remains, despite controlling for organization.
We focus on integration without welfare receipt as the outcome variable. Complete results for the probit estimations are available on request. Table 4 Include Table 4 here.
Similar to the matching results, we find a negative effect of decentralization for men.
However, the effect is smaller (up to 2.5 percentage points) and significant only in the middle of the observation period. For women, the effect of decentralized agencies is again insignificant. The organizational variables themselves are mostly insignificant, the effect of an employer service in the subsample of women being the only exception. The complete set of results shows that this effect is negative and significant at 10% in the last four months of the observation period. This could be interpreted as evidence that the presence of a specific organizational unit of the agency specializing in employer contacts is a disadvantage for women. Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence with which this result can be validated.
The significant negative effect of decentralized welfare agencies on employment without welfare receipt for men is largely robust to the inclusion of further organizational strategies despite a slight decline in magnitude. We conclude that this effect is due to the inherent differences between centralized and decentralized welfare agencies, not to the adoption of particular forms of internal organization.
Conclusions
The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational systems in an otherwise homogenous institutional setting: decentralized and centralized wel-fare agencies. In order to evaluate their relative performance, we estimate their effect on the integration of welfare recipients into the labor market. Our analysis takes regional differences as well as individual selection into account. Estimation is based on exceptionally rich data from various sources. We combine a detailed survey of welfare recipients with administrative records from the Federal Employment Agency. In addition, we use a large set of variables when describing the local labor market. Finally, we consider qualitative information on organizational details for each welfare agency in our sample.
We find that decentralized welfare agencies have a negative effect on male welfare recipients with respect to integration into self-sufficient employment, i.e. employment without welfare receipt. We find insignificant effects for women and for employment with supplementary welfare receipt. Based on these results, we conclude that centralized welfare administration performs better in integrating male welfare recipients into employment as opposed to female welfare recipients. Given the low transition intensity from welfare receipt into employment, the magnitudes of the effects for men are substantial.
Why are there gender differences with respect to the relative performance of the two types of welfare agencies? In our interpretation, centralized standards and routines work effectively for welfare recipients without additional obstacles to employment. Once additional obstacles come into play, such as a lack of child care facilities, standardized placement loses its effectiveness. In particular, tailored solutions to individual needs often require the cooperation of local participants. This is why, in our opinion, the centralized model has no advantage over the decentralized model in the case of female welfare recipients.
We explore further channels through which our results may have emerged. Because welfare agencies have significant discretionary power with respect to internal organization, we check whether the organization of tasks at individual welfare agencies is responsible for the result of decentralization. Although the effects are slightly weakened by the inclusion of the additional organizational strategies, the overall result is not affected. We conclude that the negative effect of decentralization is due to inherent differences between centralized and decentralized welfare agencies and is not subject to their choices regarding the internal organization of tasks. Examples of these inherent differences are the application of central guidelines of the Federal Employment Agency concerning the instruments of placement, activation and active labor market policy, as well as the (de)centralized controlling system. Because all centralized agencies are obligated to use the policies and standards mandated by the FEA, there is, unfortunately, no variation that could be used to distinguish these different elements.
This paper provides quantitative evidence on the effects of and decentralization of public welfare on employment transitions. The results point to the importance of the organizational aspects of welfare administration to the integration of welfare recipients into employment. In particular, they suggest that the impact of organization differs between labor market groups. Given the high complexity of the public welfare system, identifying successful and less successful strategies for the organization of welfare administration remains a difficult yet highly relevant task. Remarks: McFadden-R 2 derives from a probit estimation of the propensity score on all covariates considered. The LR-statistic and the corresponding p-value derive from a likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all covariates. The mean standardized bias has been calculated as an unweighted average of all covariates. The Smith-Todd test displays the number of covariates passing the test at the indicated significance level. There are 26 total covariates. 
Tables and Figures
Generalized Case Management
Case managers counsel all types of clients. There is no assignment of welfare recipients with multiple obstacles to employment to specialist caseworkers.
Better placement under specialized case management if clients with specific problems require specialized expertise. Generalized case management facilitates individual counseling as clients have fewer contact persons.
0.69 (decentralized agencies) 0.24 (centralized agencies)
Integration of Activation and Placement
Clients are counseled (activated) and placed into employment by the same staff members. There is no assignment of specialized staff to the two tasks.
Integration reduces the number of contact persons for each welfare recipient, and facilitates a holistic approach. In contrast, separation leads to gains from specialization but may create coordination problems at the interface of both tasks.
(decentralized)
0.59 (centralized)
Customer Segmentation
Classification of clients into different groups receiving different treatment during activation Segmentation may increase employment rates among groups that are activated more intensely but reduces integration into employment in other groups.
(decentralized) 0.66 (centralized)
Employer Service
A team of agency staff members maintains a network with employers and serves as contact persons for them
Networking may result in better placement. However, internal coordination problems between the employer service and caseworkers may arise.
(decentralized)
(centralized)
Subcontracting of Placement Services
The welfare agency uses private employment services to place some of their clients into employment.
Specialization gains may occur. However, private agencies may work more or less effectively compared to the public employment service. Requires proper assignment of welfare recipients to service providers.
0.41 (decentralized ) 0.40 (centralized ) Remarks: Marginal effects (first row) and standard errors (second row) are displayed *** denotes p<0.01, ** denotes p<0.05, and * denotes p<0.1. The dependent variable in each model and for each month is defined as 1 if an individual is employed and does not receive welfare benefits anymore. Otherwise, the variable is 0. The number of observations in each model is 6217. Standard errors take into account clustering at the agency level. All models include the covariates used in the preferred propensity score specification of the matching analysis as further regressors. The detailed results are not displayed here but are available from the authors upon request. Notes: ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level Notes: ♦ indicates significance at the 5% level, ◊ significance at the 10% level 
